Appendix item 1.
Click HERE for link to the archived document.
Statement for the France-Germany-Russia Summit in Deauville
(18-19 October 2010)
The President of the French Republic, the President of the Russian Federation and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany met in Deauville yesterday and today to conduct in-depth exchanges on a number of international issues of common interest.
Regarding the G20 and the G8, Germany and Russia welcomed the ambition of the next French Presidency to strengthen the role of these key bodies in defining and implementing concrete responses to the global challenges facing the world.
Regarding the Middle East, France, Germany and Russia urge Israel to make efforts to ensure the continuation and success of the peace negotiations, as they urge the Palestinians, in this context, to remain engaged in these negotiations. Our three countries support American efforts in this direction and are prepared to contribute actively to the peace process.
President Sarkozy, President Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel discussed Iran's nuclear programme and the measures taken by the international community. They called on Iran to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors and recalled that the door to dialogue will be kept open so as to arrive at a negotiated solution to this issue.
[italics added] They confirm their commitment to enhance the strategic Russia-EU partnership. They expressed their support for the ongoing negotiations of the New EU-Russia Agreement, the implementation of the “Partnership for Modernization” initiative and cooperation in security and foreign policy matters. They looked forward to progress being made on common steps towards a visa-free travel regime at the EU-Russia Summit in December taking into account the offer presented by the EU. France, Germany and Russia subscribe to the strategic vision of a common space founded on the values of democracy, the rule of law and in which there would be free movement of people, goods, services and capital.
Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, President Sarkozy, President Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel reaffirm their commitment to work jointly on security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area. They stressed that the upcoming meeting of 56 leaders at the OSCE Astana Summit would be a significant opportunity for progressing towards this objective. They called for the strengthening of institutional and operational cooperation between Russia and the EU as well as in the NATO-Russia-Council in order to confront the common threats to our security. They agreed to explore possibilities for closer cooperation in very concrete ways that contribute to mutual confidence and facilitate collective action for crises prevention and management, i.e. in progressing towards a solution of the protracted conflicts such as Transnistria.
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Appendix Item 2
The 2010 NATO First Act, Section 5 relating to changes to NATO forces
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SEC. 5. Extended deterrence commitment to Europe.
(a) Policy on extended deterrence commitment to Europe.-It is the policy of the United States that-
(1) it maintain its commitment to extended deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an important component of ensuring and linking the national security interests of the United States and the security of its European allies;
(2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the United States shall remain based in Europe in support of the nuclear policy and posture of NATO; and
(3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States in Europe-combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons-contributes to the cohesion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.
(b) Limitation on reductions in nuclear forces based in Europe.-In light of the policy expressed in subsection (a), no action may be taken to effect or implement the reduction of nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe unless-
(1) the reduction in such nuclear forces is requested by the government of the host nation in the manner provided in the agreement between the United States and the host nation regarding the forces; or
(2) the President certifies that-
(A) the nuclear policy and nuclear posture of NATO has changed, reducing the need for such nuclear forces to be based in Europe;
(B) NATO member states have considered the reduction in the High Level Group and NATO has decided to support such reduction;
(C) the remaining nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe after such reduction provide a commensurate or better level of safety, security, reliability, and credibility as before such reduction;
(D) such reduction is compensated by other measures (such as nuclear modernization, conventional forces, and missile defense) which together provide a commensurate or better deterrence capability and assurance of NATO member states in a manner consistent with the NATO Strategic Concept; and
(E) the Russian Federation has made commensurate reductions to its deployed tactical nuclear weapons.
(c) Report.-Upon any decision to reduce the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report containing-
(1) the certification required by subsection (b)(2);
(2) justification for such reduction; and
(3) an assessment of how NATO member states, in light of such reduction, assess the credibility of the deterrence capability of the United States in support of its commitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, District of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).
(d) Notice and wait requirement.-The President may not commence a reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States that are based in Europe for which the certification required by subsection (b)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180-day period beginning on the date on which the President submits the report under subsection (c) containing the certification.
(e) Authorization of appropriations.-There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator for Nuclear Security a total of $300,000,000 for fiscal year 2011 for-
(1) developing the F-35 Lightning II aircraft into a dual-capable aircraft by outfitting it with a nuclear-capable delivery system; and
(2) supporting the life extension program for the B61 gravity bomb.
(End of Section 5 NATO First Act)
Appendix Item 3
The USA’s Recent Wars and Armed Interventions driven by its Military-Industrial Complex, ie the coordinated interests of the US government, military and business.
Korea and China 1950-53
El Salvador 1980s
Somalia 2007/8, 2011
Libya 2011, 2015
Appendix Item 4
Links relating to the EU-Russia Partnership For Modernization
Slide Presentation on Technologial Upgrade of the Russian Economy:
Russia-EU Strategic Partnership: Statement by the Russian Embassy to the UK:
2020 RIAC: A Sad Anniversary - Ten Years of the Partnership for Modernization comment by Andrey Kortunov:
June 17 2010 Carnegie Institute’s Insulting commentary on the EU-Russian Partnership discussions showing USA reaction:
2021 Observer Research Foundation review - The End of a Strategic Partnership. Note, no mention of USA role in 2014 coup:
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